af

929565 134

Upswing in
Sino~North

Korean Ties |

North Kerea has made a substantial and largely
successful effort to improve relations with Beijing
ener the pust yodr, in part to counterbalance wiiat it
seen as grosdag US suppoce fur Seoul, The Ne
Kuréan success with yea reflects bath ins

anata North Korean overtures, aing’s favorable
fesponse is fd line with its longstanding gos! of
nizintaining influence in Pyongyang. China, however,
TONCAES The Lacks suppart of the status quo in Korea,
and we foresee no major chadge in North Korean
policy resulting from its inrproved relationship with
Beijing.

China~USSR~Marth Korean ‘Criangle

The period in. which North Korean relations with
China have bee closer than its tes with the Soviet
Valor cur be traced back te 1969-70, At thet time,
Beijing was moving ioward & rapprochement with the
United Stares anal caneurcently togk special efforts to
shore up its relationshin with Pyonnyvang to keep the
North Koreans fron: drifting inte Moscow's arbit.
Mure in large part to greater Chinese attention, ane to
the Soviet istlure 40 compete energetically, Sind—
North Korean ties remained generally good in the
19s. Toward the ond of the decade, however, when
Beijing secelerated ita efforts 16 normalize relations
with the United States, some tension in Bebing-
P*yongyang ties began 10 appeac,

Kim L-song slowet certainly saw in formal Sing-US
nornelaation in earky 197% renewed evidence of
China’s willingness to subordinate P’yongyang’s inter
ests te its own broader strategic concerns. Beijing, for
example, became noticeably fess supportive of P’yang-
yang’s insistence on the withdrawal of US forces frost
South Borea. At the same tiem, China began to refax
its longstanding probibition of direct trade with South

by

Korea. By 1981, total trade amounted 40 almost S300
million, approaching Ute level of China's trade with

the North

Concern about die paisible consequences of ¢loser
Sing-US cooperation prompaed Pyongyang initially
te step up its efforts to court the Saviets. North
Korean tisssages marking the October Revolution
became noticosbly warater ia 1978 and 1979. By
Atgust (980, the 35th anniversary of Hberation from
Japanese tule, Kim Hesong for the first time to many
years publicly acknowledged the cole af the Soviel
Red Arty in defswting Japan, Previously, the North
Koreans had emphasized} Une with the elinete
idealagy of self-religawe—only the role af Kim's quer
fillas. The North Koreans followed up this gesture by
sending Prener Vi Chong-ck, the fifth-ranking offf-
cial in the perty hierarchy, 0 the 26th Soviet Cam-
munist Party Congress it Pebruury £981. But Migs
Cow biegely ignored these moves. The Soviets
pontinued to refuse to supoly advanced weupans sys-
‘penis tothe North and (6 resteict economic suppori,
Moscow, which bad long been uncomfortable with
Kim B-song’s independent and sometimes erratic
policies, alae was displeased with Pyongyang’s failure
to meek its bilateral trade commitments.

in contrast, South Korea’s relations with the United
States took a dramatic turn for the betier, beginning
insarty 1981, The United States reaffirmed. its
securiy coramdimont in South Keres by invithoz
President Chan Doo Hwan io Washingtea and far-
mally ending the withdrawal of US troops, This was
follawed by announcements of dhe sale of advanced
vearon ig South Korea, ech paed Fe md more

Tit Tavares Chink

Having been retuifed by Moscow, Pyongyang again
turned toward Belling in mild-1991; the Nurth Kore-
ang alist certainly caleulated tha China's concerns

we
tt BAF BLA?
i augan 9e2

ered

xhout Soviet inBuence and growing strains in US-
Ching relations over Taiwan could work in jis favor,
Ta celebrating the 20th soniversary of the Chiness—
WNarth Korean rrtual assistance treaty in duly 1981,
Pyongyang rhapsodiaed tis “blood-sealed,” “mili-
tant,” “very precious,” aid “indestructible” ties with
its “commades in. erms™ and “class brothers” dn China,
Ht had used ao comparable phrases in marking the
20th anniversiry of its nearly identical weaty with
Moscow a few days earlier, Ea

Beiling responded positively with visite hy Premier
Shao Zipang in December (961 and Defense Minister
Geng Hiao in, June (982. These gestures, moreover,
were made in the context of Foreign policy themes
emphasizing Ching’s Third World ties and iss inde-
pendent interetional role. Phe Chinese may have felt
less constrained in wreking auch a reaponse 2s a result
of the strains in Sino-US ties. Bath visits were isarked
by unusually strong attacks on Washington's policy
toward Korea. Zhao characterized ihe US rroop
presenes in. the South as “a major factor in the
instability of Northeast Asia.” Geng carried this
comment a step further by referring 10 the “US
hewemmociats and Urele plot to create two Koreas," an
indirsat reflestion of China’s criticism of US policy on
Taiwan. Between chess visits, the Chinese delivered
40 F-7 fighters (China’s version. of the MiG-21) to
Worth Korea, the first delivery of combat airceaft
since the normalization of Sine-CiS relations. There
ure else some indications that the Chinese aay have
been curtatling theit trade with the Soulk Koreans
sinos early this year, although Beijing appears to be
cautiously dontiiuing 1 expand ilficlal contacts
with South Korea, expecially in athletic competitions.

Beijing tay regard the teanster of leadership from
Kim U-song to his son Kim Chong-il as well advanced
taut still fraught with considerable uncertainty, De-
spite its past reservations about this process, Beving
may hope that investing mace in its ties with Pyong~
yang now will build capital with a successor leader-
ship—and perhaps indirectly rainimize the chances
that Worth Koes, like Vietnam, will becore hostile
itt the furnre,

ee

tn this regard, et the Chinese Ambassador's reception
commemorating the aniversary of the China—Norih
Korea mutual assistance treaty in July, the North
Korean Foreign Minister invoked Kim Choag-i’s
que for the first since in a foreign affairs contest.
Worth Rores also used that oceasion, as it had the
prevings svar, to demonstrate the substantial imibad-
ance existing in its relations with its wo mayor allies.
The Pyongyang media again gave the anniversary of
iis treaty with Moscow anly brief coverage and none
of the detail or warmth that characterized fis covers
age of the Chinwse ob¢ervance, Moscow's. Korean
langdage broadcast on the occasion repeated + high~
feve] Soviet trade official's eriilodan of Pyongyang for
Tuiling “Ye fulfill tts agreements in their entinety™ in
the past

The new wariith ia Sino-Notih Korean relations is
further uaderseored by reports thet Kim H-song will
visit Beijing in August or September, ihe first vine
sines 1975, IC such a trig lakes place, Kita could be
expected to ask Chinese leaders for more material ©
support and greater backing for his political goals,
But be also would probably want to review with the
Chincse the status of their relations with the United
States and personally assess the domestic poliey and
isudership changes under way in Chins la

The Chinwse might see suck a visit in both dilaterel
and international terms, Ht would he a. strong demon-
stration of support for Kim and his policies. But it
would alse provide the Chinese a forum to dermon-
strate a strengthened commitment to the Third World
ly hottusing one of che presuitied leaders of the
Nonaligned Movement. &

No Fundamental Change ie Potiay

We believe none of these developments signifies a
fundamental change in Ching’s tacix support for ihe
status qua on the Korcan Peninsols. Beijing is. aware
that Kim's current oro-Chinese stance is not based on
an idedlogicn? commitment but on Soviet anwiling-
ness to compete for P’yongyang's faver—a fect that
linits Pyongyang’s leverage with Ching. Current
Chinese support is kanpered by Beijing's destre ta
mgintain Korean stability. This was clearly evident

during the Geng nin. Por alf the offusiveness sur-
soinding the visit, the Chinese Defense Minister
stuck to the routine formula thet 115 traggs and
military equipment should be withdrawn, without

giving a Hane frame. al

Pr ae

P'yougyang's sensitivity about the issue of timing was
well demonstrated when, secordiag t FRIS field
coverage, the North Karan translator added the
word “inumediniely” ts Gene's statement of troop
withdrawal end the North Korean radio and preus
reported the translator's version. A Chinese Foreign
Ministery officlal tater tok pains to explain toa US
official in Beijing that China's policy taward P'yong-
yang had not changed and that be had net noticed the
ward “immediately” in the Geng statenvent.

P'yongyang's lt toward one of its traditionn] allies ig
fot new, Narth Korea has been careful, however, aut
to side totally with one or the other, avoiding a direct
attack on either. Pur instance, Pyongyang denuuaced
the Vielnamese invasion of Kampuchea as outra-
yoous, but was slleat an the subsequent Chinese
incursion inte Vietnam and the Soviet invaslon of
Adghanistaa. 4

On balance, North Korea seems most likely to contin
ue With its current cfforts te strenglhen ties with
Beijing, a policy that tus paid a least limited divi-
dends in terms of Chinese political, ecanomid, and
military support. Pyongyang is almost corlainly hope
fol that steaing in Sino-US relarions will seanehow
wark to its advantage, At the sume dime, the North
seams likely to probe from time wo tine for additional
Soviet support—anot with high expectatians perhaps,
but out of prudence because potential guing could be
considerable, Indewd, only the Soglets can provide the
silvanced technology end weapons systems that the
North wants. Moscow, however, fas sherwn Hethe
inclination to provide such support. Jy